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Annotation. The perspective of SC and more generally of United Nations in interaction with 
ICC will not be directly investigated. It will be only incidentally and for the most relevant purposes for 
the investigation of the SC's powers to affect the content of the Treaty establishing the Court. More 
generally, any limits to the action of SC will be observed only in light of the repercussions that may 
have on the jurisdictional activity of ICC. From an internal perspective, so to speak, to the Court itself, 
it should be emphasized that the autonomy referred to is only that of the ICC with respect to another 
institution, a political body, the SC. In this perspective, the present work is concentrated on the analysis 
of the crime of aggression and the role of two organs, which they have fought for years to save peoples 
and punish those who have committed atrocious crimes such as that of aggression. The method used is 
that based on sources, in particular on the statute of the ICC and on "restrictive acts" or not of the SC. 
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THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION IN STICC. REFERENCE TO UN CHARTER 
Another regulatory element contained in Statute of the International Criminal Court 
(StICC) that expresses the needs to link Security Council (SC) activity and that of ICC, concerns 
the crime of aggression. It is not possible to retrace here the long and complex path that led to 
the definition of this crime. However, it can be remembered in general that one of the reasons 
behind the difficulty of including such criminal conduct among those subject to ICC jurisdiction 
was precisely the lack of a shared and sufficiently precise definition of the criminally relevant 
behaviors and of the state acts underlying the individual crime1. 
A further element of complexity, also at the origin of the obstacles to the inclusion of the 
crime of aggression in the ICC ratione materiae competence, concerns the relationships between 
individual and state responsibility. The crime of aggression, by definition, the expression of a 
                                                          
1B. Bonafè, “The relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes”, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Leiden, Boston, 2009. 
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decision taken by the leaders of the political or military apparatus of a State also presupposes a 
responsibility for the latter. To tell the truth, other international crimes also tend to be committed 
by an individual-body therefore attributable to the State of belonging of the author of the illegal 
conduct and in any case present a collective and, so to speak, political dimension: The 
systematic attack on crimes against the humanity, the planning of war crimes, the intent to target 
a group as such in the case of genocide. No other international crime has, however, as it will 
now be better said. a presupposition and condition of the same evidence of individual criminal 
conduct, a state offense. 
The origins of a particularly close relationship between individual and state responsibility 
for aggression are already clearly visible in art. 16 of the project of crimes against peace and 
humanity drawn up by International Law Commission in 19962. In light of that provision, in 
fact, an individual would have been held responsible for the crime of aggression if "as a leader 
or organizer, participates in or orders the planning, preparation, initiation or waging of 
aggression committed by a State"3. In this perspective, in short, a necessary condition for the 
existence of individual crime was the commission of an act of aggression by a State. Moreover, 
also in light of the aforementioned art. 23 of the draft Statute, drawn up by ILC in 1994, the 
individual crime of aggression presupposes that a State had been held to have committed 
aggression4. 
Given these assumptions it was difficult to imagine that the Rome Statute did not provide 
for this particular crime a connection with the UN Charter and that the relationship between the 
two forms of responsibility was not made explicit in any way. It is almost superfluous to 
remember that art. 39 of the UN Charter grants SC the power to investigate interstate attacks. 
For this reason, in addition to the need for a general connection with the provisions of  UN 
Charter, the most specific emerged and here it is of extreme interest and importance to connect 
the jurisdictional activity of  ICC inherent in SC. 
Since no shared solution was found at the Rome Conference on the modalities of such 
                                                          
2For further details see: D. Liakopoulos, “Complicity of states in the international illicit“, Maklu editions, Portland, Antwerp, 
Apeldoorn, 2020 
3Draft Code of crimes against the peace and security of mankind, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1996, 
vol. II (part two). 
4Draft Statute of the International Criminal Court with commentaries, in Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1994, 
vol. II, part two, 1994, pp. 44ss. 
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coordination between ICC and SC, art. 5 (2) StICC5, after having precisely ordered that the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression be postponed to the future adoption of a 
definition of the crime by the determination of the conditions of activation of  ICC, limited itself 
to recommending in completely generic terms, that this provision however, it must be 
"consistent with the relevant provisions of the UN Charter"6. Now, however incidentally it may 
appear "redundant but not superfluous"7, it testifies and anticipates the main question still to be 
resolved, namely, the need to coordinate the ICC's judicial activity in repressing the individual 
crime of aggression with the competence of SC to ascertain the commission of a state act of 
aggression. 
Even more than the difficulties related to the definition of the crime of aggression were 
precisely the conditions of prosecution of the crime, also referred to in art. 5 (2), which led to 
the decision to postpone the exercise of ICC's jurisdiction over the crime of aggression to a 
future revision of the Statute8. In other words, it was a question of determining to what extent 
the repression of the crime of aggression by ICC could be conditioned by the powers attributed 
to SC for the purpose of maintaining peace and in particular of the ascertainment that that body 
is entitled to in the light of art. 30. All debates relating to the conditions of prosecution of the 
crime of aggression essentially revolve around the degree of autonomy which with respect to 
any assessment of SC should have been guaranteed to the Prosecutor for the purpose of opening 
the investigations and to the other ICC bodies for the purpose of attributing individual criminal 
liability for this particular criminal conduct9. 
 
                                                          
5O. Bekou, “The International Criminal Court”, ed. Routledge, London & New York, 2017. 
6O. Bekou, “The International Criminal Court”, op. cit., 
7B. Bonafè, “The relationship between state and individual responsibility for international crimes”, op. cit., 
8Report of the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an International Criminal Court, vol. I, UN Doc. A/51/22, 1996, 
p. 19. Many Arab and African States already suggested adopting the definition of aggression contained in Resolution n.3314 
of 1974 while other States (such as Germany) suggested a definition that best suited the requirements of penal repression, as 
far as the role of SC is concerned, however the positions seemed even more distinct. See: Report of the ad hoc Committee on 
the establishment of an International Criminal Court, A/50/223, 1995, pp. 13-15, it is also evident that some States believed 
that the crime of aggression was already at least in one of its existing essential nuclei. The fact that the crime of aggression is 
provided for in the statutes among those subject to ICC jurisdiction ratione materiae but that its actual and concrete persecution 
was postponed to a future revision intended to define its content and conditions of admissibility has usually made the report 
speak. To this period so to speak of transition of dormant jurisdiction over the crime of aggression see the expression of P. 
Kirsch, D. Robinson, “Reaching agreement at the Rome Conference”, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones, The Rome 
statute of the International Criminal Court. A commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 68ss. 
9D. Liakopoulos, “The function of accusation in International Criminal Court“, ed. Maklu, Portland, Antwerp, Apeldoorn, 
2019. 
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THE DEBATES PRECEDING THE ADOPTION OF THE STATUTE 
The debates prior to the adoption of the Rome Statute offer some indications of what were 
the terms of the issue that we intend to address here. In particular, with regard to the repression 
of the crime of aggression, it can only start from the repeatedly called art. 23 of the Statute of 
the ILC Project of 1994. Par. 2 of this provision stipulated that a case relating to the crime of 
aggression could not be subject to ICC jurisdiction "unless SC has first determined that a State 
has committed the act of aggression which is the subject of the complaint. The initial orientation 
of ILC was therefore to attribute to SC a preliminary and unavoidable competence to determine 
the commission of an act of aggression by a State's party in order to proceed with the repression 
of individual crime10. Within ILC there were opposite or at least skeptical positions with respect 
to this solution11. Several States then opposed an exclusive competence of the political body in 
determining the existence of a state of aggression. States opposed to such an incisive role of SC 
rather claimed the need to guarantee the autonomy and independence of ICC and therefore to 
recognize the latter is power to proceed even in the absence of an assessment by the political 
body12.  It can be said in general terms that the notion of aggression13 reflects the inability made 
by ILC to "divorce form its political nature". 
The divergences that emerged during the Commission's work were then repeated in the 
subsequent Preparatory Commission work, with a clear favor still for a rather marked protection 
of SC prerogatives with respect to the guarantees of independence and autonomy of ICC (art.10 
of the project). A full option included two distinct hypotheses. By virtue of the first, the ICC 
could not have exercised its jurisdiction only if the SC had expressly denied that the situation 
brought to the attention of ICC could be classified as aggression. In light of the second 
hypothesis, however, ICC jurisdiction would always have depended on an explicit assessment 
made by SC on the basis of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, aimed at determining the 
                                                          
10See, Report of the international law Commission on the work of its forty-sixth session, UN Doc. A/49/10, 2 May-22 July 
1994, pp. 86: "(...) any criminal responsibility of an individual for an act or crime of aggression necessarily presupposes that a 
state had been held to have committed aggression, and such a finding would be for the Security Council acting in accordance 
with Chapter VII of the UN Charter to make". For further analysis see: M. Schuster, “The Rome statute and the crimes of 
aggression. A gordian knot in search of a sword”, in Criminal Law Forum, 14 (1), 2003, pp. 36ss. T. Meron, “Defining 
aggression for the International Criminal Court”, in Suffolk Transnational Law Review, 25, 2001, pp. 13ss. 
11See the positions of Pellet and Bennouna, in ILC Yearbook 1994, vol. I, 2358 meeting, p. 209 and 2361, meeting, p. 227. 
12See in particular Bahrein (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR17, p. 4) and the Netherlands (UN Doc. A/C.49/SR/SR.17, p. 18), but also 
the rather critical attitudes of Greece (UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.17, p. 18), France /UN Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.19, p. 9), Israel (UN 
Doc. A/C.6/49/SR.20, p. 6) and Chile/UNDoc. A/C.6/SR.21, p. 6). 
13A.C. Carpenter, “The International Criminal Court and the crime of aggression”, in Nordic Journal of International Law, 
64, 1995, pp. 234ss. 
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commission of an act of aggression by a State14. In a second proposal, in more general terms, it 
provided for the compulsory nature of any finding made by SC on the commission or not of an 
act of aggression by a State. However, it was not clear in this different scenario what would 
have happened in the absence of SC determinations. 
Then there was a paragraph, aimed at protecting the jurisdictional activity of ICC which 
sanctioned the principle according to which any decision of SC “shall not be interpreted as in 
any way affecting the independence of the Court in its determination of the criminal 
responsibility of the person concerned"15. To tell the truth, this statement appears to be aimed 
at affirming an obvious principle of independence of the judicial function in ascertaining 
individual responsibilities. However, it does not seem to guarantee an autonomy of the Court 
with respect to SC in the event of an overlap of the action of the two bodies. It is quite evident 
in fact that if SC has the power to limit or initiate the exercise of ICC's jurisdiction over the 
crime of aggression, then preventing its activation through a negative determination about the 
existence of an act of aggression by part of a State it wants to subordinating the exercise of 
jurisdiction to a prior positive assessment regarding the commission of a crime, ICC 
independence to prosecute criminally responsible individuals is subject to the political 
assessment made by SC, which has in fact the power to preclude the action of the jurisdictional 
organ. 
The divergences that emerged on the definition of the crime of aggression and on the role 
that SC should have played in the repression of the same ICC reappeared, as a part mentioned 
also at the Rome Conference. To mark a decisive moment of the debate was an interesting 
proposal from Cameroon that while admitting the necessary pre-eminence of SC in ascertaining 
the crime of aggression was aimed at guaranteeing a margin of discretion to ICC action at least 
in the case of inertia of the political body. With this proposal it was essentially suggested that 
before ICC exercises its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, "SC shall determine the 
existence of aggression in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the UN Charter"16. 
                                                          
14Preparatory Committee Draft Statute n.110, par. 4 in its first option reads: 4. option 1 (Accompanied of or directly related to 
(an act) (a crime) of aggression (referred to in art. 5) may (not) be brought (under this Statute) unless the SC has first 
(determined) (and formally decided) that the act of a State is the subject of the complaint (is) (is not) an act of aggression 
(Chapter VII of the UN Charter). 
15A.C. Carpenter, “The International Criminal Court and the crime of aggression”, op. cit., pp. 234ss. 
16UN diplomatic conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome, 15 June-17 
July 1998, official records, vol. I, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.39. 
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However, and herein lies the most interesting element especially for the influence it will have 
in subsequent developments in the matter, it was envisaged that SC had delayed to make its 
own assessment on the commission of a state act of aggression following a request by the 
Prosecutor to do so. The latter could have initiated "an investigation for the purpose of 
establishing whether a crime of aggression within the meaning of the present statute exists"17. 
As mentioned at the Rome Conference, it was decided to postpone the matter to a future 
revision of the Statute and a special Preparatory Commission was established for this purpose18. 
The impression of many was that the ICC's jurisdiction over aggression crime "was still born". 
And according to some, its birth would never have happened. 
THE WORK FOLLOWING THE ENTRY INTO FORCE OF THE STATUE AND THE 
FIRST REVIEW CONFERENCE 
Starting in 2002, the Assembly of States Parties brought together the work of the 
Preparatory Commission into a special working group. It was the work of the latter body that 
laid the foundations for the subsequent debate that took place in the first statute review 
Conference. It is therefore appropriate to briefly analyze some of the proposals put forward by 
the States at that time, always naturally with a view to assessing the degree of autonomy that 
was intended to leave to ICC bodies with respect to SC decisions. 
The motions of some States aimed at limiting the role of SC seem to be of particular 
interest, providing for the possibility of autonomous although limited ICC action or even the 
involvement of other UN bodies. A first hypothesis put forward by France and Portugal 
suggested that ICC could exercise its jurisdiction as well as in the event that the SC had already 
pronounced in this sense pursuant to art. 39 also following a request for assessment from the 
same Court and addressed to SC, which was disregarded for a period of 12 months19. An idea 
that suggested by the two States that took up the Cameroonian proposal and destined as already 
anticipated to a certain success. Unlike another hypothesis perhaps too ambitious submitted to 
the working group by Bosnia-Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania which contemplated in 
                                                          
17A.C. Carpenter, “The International Criminal Court and the crime of aggression”, op. cit., 
18He was assigned to this body to draw up a series of proposals for a provision on aggression, including the definition and 
elements of crimes of aggression and the conditions under which the ICC shall exercise its jurisdiction with regard to this 
crime. See, par. 7 of the Resolution adopted by the UN Diplomatic Conference of plenipotentiaries on the establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998. 
19Working group on the crime of aggression, proposal submitted by Greece and Portugal, PCNICC/2000/WGCA/DP.5, 28 
November 2000. 
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an evident attempt to limit the role of SC, the involvement of General Assembly and 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)20. According to this proposal, always SC had not 
pronounced on the possible aggression within 12 months from the request of ICC or had not 
decided to endorse the turnaround of ICC using the power provided by art. 15 StICC21, the ICJ 
could have notified the GA of the situation before the Court and invite it to request to it in 
accordance with article 96 of the existence or otherwise of an act of aggression by the State 
concerned22. Only in the event that the opinion of the ICJ recommended an action by ICC, could 
the latter have proceeded in ascertaining individual liability. 
The results of the numerous discussions that took place within the working group23 then 
merged into three distinct documents, commonly called chairman's papers. These works 
highlight a certain convergence of states in relation to the definition of crimes while they still 
present different options regarding the UN organ to which the competence should have been 
attributed to carry out this assessment. In other words, discussions continued on whether to 
allow the Prosecutor to act even in the absence of an assessment, carried out by a body external 
to the statute system relating to the commission of an act of aggression by a State. In the event 
that it was wished to preclude this possibility, it remained to be decided which body between 
SC, GA and ICJ should be invested with this competence24. 
The whole debate sheds more light on the real issue being disputed, namely whether the 
SC should be given a monopoly, so to speak, in assessing the commission of aggression between 
States or, instead, we can imagine that this task is shared with other UN bodies or even at least 
for the purposes of the criminal repression left to the decision-making autonomy of an 
international tribunal established through a treaty. Despite the widespread skepticism about the 
                                                          
20D. Liakopoulos, “La tutela cautelare nella Corte internazionale di giustizia. Aspetti processuali e comparati”, ed. Amon, 
Firenze, 2012. 
21W.A. Schabas, “The International Criminal Court. A commentary to the Rome statute”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2010, pp. 302ss. 
22Working group on the crime of aggression, proposal submitted by Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania, 
PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.1, 23 February 2001. 
23Assembly of States Parties, special working group on the crime of aggression, 30 November-14 December 2007, New York, 
informal inter-sessional meeting of the special working group on the crime of aggression, ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/INF.1, 25 July 
2007. 
24See the diverse options contained in the discussion paper on the crime of aggression proposed by the Chairman, ICC-
ASP/5/SWGCA/2, 1st February 2007; Discussion paper on the crime of aggression proposed by the Chairman, ICC-
ASP/6/SWGCA/2, 14 May 2008 and discussion paper on the crime of aggression proposed by the Chairman, ICC-
ASP/SWGCA/INF.1, Annex, 19 February 2009. For further analysis see: O. Solera, “The definition of the crime of aggression: 
Lessons not learned”, in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 42, 2010, pp. 808ss. T. Lavers, “Aggression, 
intervention and powerful feminist methodologies on peace and security issues”, in Amsterdam Law Forum, 5 (2), 2013, pp. 
127ss. 
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concrete possibility of reaching a shared solution regarding the conditions for exercising ICC 
jurisdiction, the first statute review Conference held in Kampala (Uganda) in 2010 marks the 
historic compromise25, which opens the way for the permanent exercise of jurisdiction over this 
international crime by the permanent criminal court. The same Resolution adopted at the review 
Conference in 2010 stipulated that jurisdiction over the crime of aggression could only be 
activated if after the 1st January 2018, a decision had been taken to that effect in the Assembly 
of States, part of the majority required to amend the Statute (two thirds). In addition, ICC could 
have prosecuted the crime only one year after thirty States Parties to the Rome Treaty ratified 
or accepted the amendment. Thirty ratifications have been reached and in December of the last 
year, the Assembly of States Parties decided to activate ICC's jurisdiction over this particular 
crime as of 17 July 201826. It is necessary to examine what changes were introduced following 
the review Conference. 
The document presented in Kampala, the so-called Conference Room Paper27, proposed 
the elimination of art. 5 (2) and the inclusion of three different provisions. Art. 8 bis, concerning 
the definition of the crime of aggression, art. 15 bis relating to the conditions of prosecution 
against this crime in the event of a referral of a State Party or of an action proper to the 
Prosecutor and concerning the possibility of the referral being exercised by SC. 
It is worth mentioning that art. 8 bis (1) defines the crime of aggression as "the planning, 
preparation initiation or execution by a person effectively in a position to exercise control over 
or to direct the political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression which by its 
character, gravity and scale constitutes a manifest violation of the UN Charter"28. The conduct 
that can generate individual responsibility for the crime of aggression therefore presupposes, as 
had already emerged in previous attempts to define this criminal case, an act of aggression by 
the State for which the individual acts29. Art. 8 bis (2) provides for a list of which state conduct 
may constitute a prerequisite for the suppression of the crime. 
                                                          
25N. Blokker, C. Kress, “A consensus agreement on the crime of aggression: Impressions from Kampala”, in Leiden Journal 
of International Law, 20, 2010, pp. 890ss. The revision Conference was convened on par. 1 of art. 121 which provides for the 
possibility of proposing amendments to the statutes at the end of the seven years from its entry into force. 
26Assembly of States Parties, Draft Resolution proposed by the Vice-Presidents of the Assembly activation of the jurisdiction 
of the Court over the crimes of aggression, ICC-ASP/16/l.10, 14 December 2017. 
27Conference Room Paper on the crime of aggression, Doc. RC/WGCA/1, 25 May 2010. P. Webb, “International judicial 
integration and fragmentation”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013. H.H. Koh, T.F. Buchwald, “The crime of aggression: 
The United States perspective”, in American Journal of International Law, 109 (2), 2015, pp. 260ss. 
28P. Webb, “International judicial integration and fragmentation”, op. cit., 
29The amendment to the Statute also provides for a fairly high threshold of severity for the inter-state infringement, as this 
should represent a manifest violation of the UN Charter. 
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With regard to the conditions of prosecution, the proposals contained in the document 
have shown all the complexity and the composite nature of the debate and the positions taken 
by the States. The final document distinguishes two different situations as just highlighted: The 
activation of the jurisdiction upon notification of a State Party or on the initiative of the 
Prosecutor on one side and the referral of SC on the other. It is obvious that the latter case does 
not pose particular problems in principle. If the SC reports a situation to ICC, the assessment 
of individual responsibilities is functional and complementary to the action of the political body 
itself. As for the first two hypotheses, however, the reporting of a State Party or the action proper 
motu of the Prosecutor element of extreme importance of the historical Resolution adopted on 
the evening of 11 June 2010 in Kampala is the fact that the assessment of SC is not indispensable 
condition for ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. Such a solution 
undoubtedly represents a success of the majority of the States towards the permanent members 
of SC and appeared to the majority to guarantee a greater probability that the crime of 
aggression will actually be pursued in the future. Even more if we take into account the known 
reticence of SC to pronounce on the existence of a situation of aggression. Such a solution 
undoubtedly represents a success of the majority of the States towards the permanent members 
of SC and appeared to the majority to guarantee a greater probability that the crime of 
aggression will actually be pursued in the future. Even more if we take into account the known 
reticence of SC to pronounce on the existence of a situation of aggression. However, we cannot 
ignore the rather evident fact that this solution presents greater possibilities of generating 
opportunities for conflict between the judicial and political body. 
Specifically, in light of paragraphs 6, 7 and 8 of the new art. 15 bis of the Rome Statute, 
the Prosecutor before starting an investigation for a crime of genocide proper motu or on the 
basis of a report by a State must verify that SC has carried out an investigation according to 
Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, of the Commission of a state act of aggression. If SC does not 
make this determination during the six months following the notification (and the transmission 
of all the relevant documents) to the UN General-Secretary on behalf of ICC regarding the 
situation on which the opening of the procedure is expected, the Prosecutor can independently 
carry out the investigation, subject to an authorization from the pre-trial division and unless SC 
decides to use its referral power. 
Despite the compromise reached, it is appropriate to recall here some important limits on 
the exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression by ICC. In fact, when the ICC action 
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is activated, through the exercise of the referral power of SC there are no distinctions between 
States that are part or not of the Statute, if instead the investigations are undertaken precisely 
by the Prosecutor or on the impulse of a State Party, ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction over a 
crime committed by a citizen or on the territory of a State not part of the Statute30. Finally, as 
regards the States Parties, they can decide through a specific declaration filed by the Registrar 
not to accept ICC competence for the sole crime of aggression31. 
In conclusion to the most important question of the entire debate on the role of SC with 
respect to the repression of the crime of aggression, that is whether or not an organ should be 
recognized as an organ in the assessment of the existence of an aggression must be given a 
negative answer. From the point of view of ICC this is reflected in a considerable degree of 
autonomy of the Prosecutor in proceeding even in the absence of an assessment by the political 
body. On the other hand, it had already been recognized on several occasions that the primary 
responsibility attributed to SC of art. 24 of the UN Charter for the maintenance of peace and 
security must not be considered exclusive and that some functions in this area can also be 
exercised by other political or judicial bodies. A reading in this sense had already emerged in 
the General Assembly during the adoption of the Resolution uniting for peace. In that particular 
context, it was found that art. 10 of the UN Charter gives the General Assembly the power to 
discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter in particular if SC 
does not exercise the powers attributed to it32. 
Furthermore, in light of articles 12 and 14 of the UN Charter33, GA can make 
recommendations regarding the measures to be adopted for a peaceful settlement of any 
controversy that could prejudice the peaceful relations between the States except in the case in 
which SC itself is dealing with the question. In short, a residual and secondary responsibility of 
the general assembly in matters of maintaining peace and security is now considered well 
                                                          
30See par. 5 of art. 15 bis. 
31See par. 4 of art. 5 bis. 
32Resolution n.377 (V) (1950), Uniting for peace (3 November 1950) this is the most well-known and relevant step: "if SC 
because of lack of unanimity of the permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security in any case where appears to be a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, 
the GA shall consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate recommendations to members for collective 
measures, including in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security. If not in session at the time the GA shall therefore meet in emergency special session 
within twenty-four hours of the request. Such emergency special session may be called if requested by SC on the vote of any 
members (nine since 1965) or by a majority of the UN members (...)". 
33W.A. Schabas, “The International Criminal Court. A commentary to the Rome statute”, op. cit., 
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established. 
Similar reasoning can be made towards the Courts. The same ICJ as it is known has expressly 
ruled that the liability provided for by art. 24 "is primary, not exclusive"34 and on more than 
one occasion recalled the different roles that a Court and a political body play and affirmed the 
idea and the principle of the possible parallel exercise of their respective functions35. The 
recognition of an autonomous prerogative of assessment in relation to the Commission of state 
acts of aggression also seems in line with these reconstructions. On the other hand, while 
inevitably overlapping the action of SC in the context of the maintenance of international peace 
and security, the function assigned to ICC maintains its own distinct and precise specificity: 
The repression of an individual crime. 
POSSIBLE COORDINATION PROBLEMS BETWEEN ICC AND SC IN THE 
REPRESSION OF THE CRIME OF AGGRESSION. PROCEDURAL ISSUES: 
ARTICLES 15A AND 15B 
The fact that an investigation by SC regarding the Commission of a state act of aggression 
is not an essential precondition for prosecution undoubtedly represents an important guarantee 
of autonomy for ICC in the repression of the crime of aggression. Compared to other ICC 
related crimes, however, more and more stringent conditions for exercising jurisdiction are 
                                                          
34International Court of Justice, Certain United Nations expenses (article 117, par. 2 of the charter), opinion of 20 July 1962, 
in ICJ Reports 1962, pp. 163ss. For further analysis see: M. Ruda, “Nulidad de los tratados”, in Y. Dinstein, M. Tabory, 
“International law at a time of perplexity. Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne”, ed. Springer, Dordrecht, Boston, London, 
1989, pp. 150ss. 
35International Court of Justice (ICJ), Military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. 
United States), par. 95, "the Council has functions of a political nature assigned to it, whereas the Court exercise purely judicial 
functions. Both organs can therefore perform their separate but complementary functions with respect to the same events"; case 
concerning the application of the convention on the prevention and repression of the crime of genocide (Bosnia-Herzegovina 
v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), order of 13 September 1993, in ICJ Reports, par. 33. Armed activities in the territory 
of Congo (Republic Democratic of Congo v. Uganda), order of 1st July 2000, in ICJ Reports 2000, par. 36.The idea that the 
ICC could legitimately contribute to determining the situations of aggression, independently of an assessment made by SC, 
was widely affirmed even before the Rome Conference. See in argument: P. Escarameia, “The ICC and the Security Council 
on aggression: Overlapping competencies”, in M. Politi, G. Nesi, The International Criminal Court: A challenge to impunity, 
Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2001, pp. 134ss. M.S. Stein, “The Security Council, the International Criminal Court and the 
crime of aggression: How exclusive is the Security Council's power to determine aggression?”, in Indiana International and 
Comparative Law Review, 16 (1), 2005, pp. 4ss. S. Barriga, C. Kress, “The travaus preparatoires of the crime of aggression”, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012. J.D. Van Der Vyver, “Prosecuting the crime of aggression in the ICC”, in 
University of Miami National Security & Armed Conflict Law Review, 2010-2011, 1, pp. 17ss. M. Mccabe, “Balancing 
aggression and compassion in international law: The crime of aggression and humanitarian intervention”, in Fordham Law 
Review, 83 (2), 2014, pp. 999ss. C. Mcdougal, “The crime of aggression under the Rome statute of the International Criminal 
Court”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, pp. 215ss. 
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provided for this particular crime36. 
Although not all closely related to the interactions between ICC and SC, these limits to 
ICC jurisdiction are a clear consequence of the autonomy recognized by the Prosecutor in 
pursuing the crime of aggression. It is therefore worth mentioning it briefly. 
Indeed, as regards the possibility of a report by SC, the changes do not present particular 
elements of novelty with respect to what is foreseen in relation to the other crimes covered by 
the ICC's jurisdiction. By virtue of art. 15 ter StICC, SC can exercise its referral power as 
provided for in art. 13 b) also in relation to the crime of aggression. As emerged during the first 
chapter, the possibility that SC indicates which crimes it believes have been committed in a 
given situation does not prevent the ICC bodies from qualifying a certain conduct differently. 
Similar reasoning can be performed in the event that a SC decision, through which it exercises 
its power of referral, expressly ascertains the Commission of a state act of aggression. This 
latter aspect is further highlighted from par. 14 of art 15 ter, which states that the assessment of 
an act of aggression "by an organ outside the Court shall be without prejudice to its own findings 
under this Statute"37. In particular ICC could decide not to precede in the repression of the 
crime, believing differently from what hypothetically stated by SC in its report that there has 
been no state act of aggression or that despite this act has occurred it is not possible to ascertain 
a corresponding individual liability38. 
As in part anticipated, the differences compared to the conditions of prosecution against 
the other crimes under  ICC jurisdiction emerge instead in the hypotheses of referral of a State 
Party or of the Prosecutor's action. The amendments made to the Statute provide that ICC cannot 
exercise its jurisdiction over citizens or crimes committed on the territory of the aggressor State 
that has previously declare that it does not accept such jurisdictions by lodging a declaration 
with the register (art. 15 bis (4))39. The ICC cannot exercise its jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression perpetrated by an upright citizen against the territory of a State Party to the Statute. 
Similarly, the exercise of ICC jurisdiction over the aggression committed on the territory of a 
State not part of the Stature by a citizen of a State Party is excluded. These particular limitations 
                                                          
36It highlights the costs of the choice made in Kampala. C. Stahn, “The "end", the "beginning of the end" or the "end of the 
beginning"? Introducing debates and voices on the definition of aggression”, in Leiden Journal of International Law, 23, 2010, 
pp. 880ss. 
37P. Webb, “International judicial integration and fragmentation”, op. cit., 
38In this sense the first comments related to ILC Project of 1994 of the Statute already went. For further details see: A.C. 
Carpenter, “The International Criminal Court and the crime of aggression”, op. cit., pp. 236ss. 
39O. Bekou, “The International Criminal Court”, op. cit., 
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which distinguish the extent of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression in relation to the 
other three categories of crimes in a rather incisive way, do not apply in the case of a referral 
from SC. In practice, if the latter hypothesis is excluded, the ICC can exercise its jurisdiction 
only when a State Party to the Statute attacks another one. 
In general terms, it is evident that with respect to the referral of a State Party or to the 
own action of the Prosecutor, the activation of ICC by SC envisaged by art. 15b, prefigures 
exactly as for the other cases of exercise of the power of referral a hypothesis of convergence 
between the action of the political body and that of the permanent tribunal. It is important to 
underline, however, that in this case the SC is not required to carry out an assessment of any 
state aggression that is the basis of its referral. As expected from art. 13 b) in fact, SC can limit 
itself to reporting a situation in which one of the crimes under ICC jurisdiction has been 
committed. In short, the time when SC decides to start the Prosecutor's investigations into a 
specific context of violence, ICC bodies will then ascertain whether the aggression is among 
the crimes committed. 
The main problems of coordination between the SC action and ICC jurisdictional activity 
evidently arise in the hypotheses provided for by art. 15 bis relating to the referral of a State 
Party and to the proprio motu of the Prosecutor. As already anticipated, it is clear that having 
guaranteed an autonomy to ICC in ascertaining the Commission of a state act of aggression as 
a prerequisite for the corresponding individual crime, is at the origin of possible conflicts 
between the two organizations in these hypotheses. 
In principle, a convergence in the action of the two organs is also possible in the case of 
referral of a State Part or an action proper to the Prosecutor. The SC could, without exercising 
its power of referral, explicitly ascertain the Commission of a state act of aggression thus 
allowing the Prosecutor to proceed with the investigation (art.15 bis (7))40. Even in this 
hypothesis it is possible ICC and SC reach different conclusions. The changes made to the 
Statute confirm with the same language of art. 15 ter, that ICC is not binding on the assessments 
made by bodies external to its system (art. 15 bis (9))41. It can therefore be imagined that despite 
the assessment made by SC, the Prosecutor decides not to request the opening of the 
investigations or this is denied by the pre-trial division. In order to avoid such a scenario of 
                                                          
40O. Bekou, “The International Criminal Court”, op. cit., 
41W.A. Schabas, “The International Criminal Court. A commentary to the Rome statute”, op. cit., 
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open contrast between ICC and the political body, SC could then choose to exercise its referral 
power provided by art. 15 ter42. As just noted in the exercise of this power, the SC is not required 
to make any express assessment of the specific state acts of aggression underlying its reporting. 
He may prefer to initiate investigations on a particular criminal context without exposing 
himself to a conflict with the ICC as to whether or not an attack by one State is damaging to 
another. 
Although the hypothesis is unlikely, one can also ask what happens in the event that SC 
expressly establishes that in a given context no state act of aggression has been committed. Art. 
15 bis does not contemplate this hypothesis since the verification that the Prosecutor is called 
to perform in relation to SC action concerns the possibility that the latter has made a positive 
assessment about the Commission of an act of aggression by a State. The provision does not 
seem to preclude the possibility of ICC proceeding against a crime of aggression even in the 
face of a clear position taken by SC aimed at denying the assumption of the state act of 
aggression. In other words, the hypothesis of a negative assessment of SC about the conduct of 
aggression if they believe, unlike the SC, that a state act of aggression was instead committed. 
It is worth pointing out that within art. 15 bis43, at least two elements seem to balance to 
a certain extent the absence of any form of control of SC over the ICC's judicial action on 
aggression. In the first place even if the wording appears superfluous art. 15 bis (8) reminds 
that the SC can always request the suspension of the investigation or of a proceeding pursuant 
to art. 16 StICC44. Secondly, always with a view to balancing the absence of a filter by SC with 
respect to ICC action, then the same art. 15 bis (8) entrusts the task of authorizing the opening 
of investigations with respect to the crime of aggression to the pre-trial division, rather than as 
foreseen for the other crimes to one of the preliminary chambers. 
(FOLLOWS): SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES: ART. 8 BIS 
The definition of crime of aggression contained in art. 8 bis largely follows the Resolution 
n.3314 of 1974, adopted by the UN General Assembly. However, the basic approach of the 
changes prepared through the review conference and some specific editorial choices mark 
important differences compared to the definition drawn up at the general meeting. 
                                                          
42S. Barriga, N. Blokker, “Conditions for the exercise of jurisdiction based on state referrals and propio motu investigations”, 
in C. Kress, S. Barriga, “The crime of aggression: A commentary”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2017, pp. 662ss. 
43O. Bekou, “The International Criminal Court”, op. cit., 
44See in argument: C. Wenaweser, “Reaching the Kampala compromise: The chair's perspective”, in Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 23 (4), 2010, pp. 888ss. 
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Art. 8 bis (2) StICC reports with identical letter only art. 3 of the definition contained in 
Resolution n.3314 of 1974. However, while in the Resolution of GA, state behavior was 
considered as presumptively constituting aggression in art. 8 bis every single conduct 
constitutes an act of aggression. In fact, an attempt was made at GA to protect as much as 
possible the role of SC that could have considered those same conduct not sufficiently serious 
to configure a hypothesis of state aggression45. In the Rome Statute, on the other hand, the 
assessment of the seriousness of the violation of the rules on the use of force as a constituent 
element of the definition of aggression contained in art. 8 bis (1) is remitted to ICC bodies. 
Art. 8 bis also does not contain a provision similar to art. 4 of Resolution n.3314 which 
recognizes SC power to ascertain that other acts constitute aggression beyond the terms 
expressly contained in the definition. The inclusion of this part of Resolution n.3314 of 1974 in 
the Rome Statute would have posed many compatibility problems with the principle of legality. 
It would have opened the way to the possibility of punishing an individual on the assumption 
of state conduct qualified by SC as an act of aggression only at a time after the entry into force 
of the rule46. In art. 8 bis, there are also no references to the irrelevance of political, economic, 
military or other reasons that can be justified by the act of aggression (art. 5 of Resolution 
n.3314 of 1974) nor is the need to preserve the principle of self-determination of peoples. All 
these choices mark the attempt to adapt the definition elaborated by the general assembly to the 
jurisdictional function of ICC. No longer essentially the typical language of the policy-
contextual mode of decision making of SC but rather the textual rule based on ICC decision47. 
In other words, the editorial choices made at the review Conference reflect the need for legal 
certainty and to reduce, as far as possible, the space for political evaluations by the ICC bodies. 
Precisely because of the different nature of the functions that perform the assessment that 
ICC and SC are called to perform in the matter of aggression, it is based on partially distinct 
legal bases. The DSC, as the Resolution n.3314 of 1974 well points out, enjoys an extremely 
wide discretion in establishing state acts that may fall into the category of aggression. ICC is 
                                                          
45S.D. Murphy, “The crime of aggression at the International Criminal Court”, in M. Weller, The oxford handbook of the use 
of force in international law, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015, pp. 542ss. E.P. Reale, “Chronicles from Kampala 
amending the Rome statute”, in Revue Internationale de Droit Pénal, 82, 2011, pp. 258ss. C. Mcdougall, “The crime of 
aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 258ss. 
46F.P. King, “The crime of aggression: Is it amenable to judicial determination?”, in B.S. Brown, “Research handbook on 
International Criminal Court”, Edward Elgar Publishers, Cheltenham, 2011, pp. 128ss. 
47W.M. Reisman, “Reflections on the judicialization of the crime of aggression”, in The Yale Journal of International Law, 39, 
2014, pp. 72ss. 
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required to verify the implementation of one of the specific conduct envisaged by its statutes. 
This does not detract from the fact that art. 8a StICC is couched in open-ended, valutative 
language48. In this regard, it may be sufficient to remember that the act of aggression underlying 
the individual crime must by its character, gravity and scale constitute a manifest violation of 
the UN Charter. These are rather flexible regulatory parameters that are not easy to define and 
that ultimately imply a judicial choice that can have very significant political repercussions. 
The point is essentially that as far as art. 8 bis attempting to frame the crime of aggression in a 
list of determinable conduct the prerequisite for repression in a list of determinable conduct the 
prerequisite for the criminal repression of that individual behavior remains a state conduct likely 
to be implemented in the context of hugely important political-military events. 
Beyond these general considerations on the particularly complex role that the ICC will 
be called upon to play in the suppression of the crime of aggression, a series of coordination 
problems between the exercise of jurisdiction and SC action can more concretely emerge in the 
light of the specific content of the assessment and possibly made by SC and the meaning that 
ICC bodies intend to attribute to that determination. 
Some problematic aspects may concern the subjects involved in the act of aggression. It 
can be imagined that SC, as already happened, condemns an act of armed aggression towards a 
State without identifying the aggressor State or the relationship existing between the mercenary 
groups responsible for those conducted with a specific state entity49. Art. 8 bis (2) (g) StICC 
states that in relation to the sending of irregular groups to the territory of a State there must be 
at least a substantial involvement of the aggressor State. In the absence of a clear assessment of 
SC relating to the attribution to a State of the illegal conduct configuring the act of aggression 
it could then be the ICC in full autonomy recognized by the Statute to proceed in this delicate 
work of identification of the aggressor State and the individuals responsible for the illegal act50. 
Similar difficulties may also arise in relation to the victim of the attack. Art. 8 bis establishes 
that aggression must be directed against a State. Even in this case, it may happen that SC does 
not identify the State of these attacks in its assessment of the Commission of a series of acts of 
aggression. Once again, ICC having satisfied the assumption relating to the determination of 
                                                          
48D. Scheffer, “Amending the crime of aggression under the Rome Statute”, in C. Kress, S. Barriga, The crime of aggression: 
A commentary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 1480ss. 
49See in particular the resolutions relating to the situations in Benin and the Seychelles: Resolutions 405 of 14 April 1977 and 
496 of 15 December 1981. 
50N. Strapatsas, “The practice of the Security Council regarding the concept of aggression”, in C. Kress, S. Barriga, The crime 
of aggression: A commentary, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012, pp. 184ss. 
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SC regarding the Commission of a state act of aggression, could find itself having to identify 
the victim of aggression in order to be able to determine its jurisdiction over illegal conduct. 
Another series of problems can arise in relation to the content of the specific illegal state 
conduct subject to the assessment made by the political body. No question if SC uses the terms 
contained in art. 8 bis (2) by explicitly qualifying a state conduct such as invasion, military 
occupation, bombardment or any of the illegal conduct listed in the provision. This, moreover, 
has already occurred in the past. In resolution n.424 of 1978 SC condemned for example the 
invasive armed of Zambia by Rodesia of Sud as a consequence of the continuance of its acts of 
aggression. On another occasion through Resolution n.546 of 1984 SC condemned South Africa 
"for its renewed, intensified, premeditated and unprovoked bombing, as well as the continuing 
occupation of parts of the territory of Angola"51. The following year, for example, SC again 
stigmatized "South Africa's (...) unprovoked and unwarranted military attack on the capital of 
Botswana as an act of aggression"52. Israel's air raid on Tunisian territory of 1st October 1985 
was also classified by SC as an act of armed aggression53 and could fall under the letter of art. 
8 bis (2) (g), as an attack by "(...) the armed forces of a State on the land (...) or of another 
State"54. As expressly clarified in the amendments made to the elements of the crimes, in fact 
each of the conduct listed from art. 8 bis (2) represents an act of aggression. In these cases, the 
prosecutor should not have particular problems in considering the SC's assessment in relation 
to the Commission of a state act of aggression satisfied. More problematic is the hypothesis in 
which SC does not use a terminology corresponding to the statutory data. In the past, for 
example, SC condemned the economic blockade or military threats from Rhodesia of South to 
Zambia as provocative and aggressive acts55. State deeds that are not contained in art. 8 bis (2) 
of the articles of association and against which the ICC may therefore decide not to exercise its 
jurisdiction as state conduct irrelevant to the detection of the crime of aggression56. 
                                                          
51Strapatsas, N., “The practice of the Security Council regarding the concept of aggression”, in C. Kress, S. Barriga, The crime 
of aggression: A commentary, op. cit., pp. 188ss. 
52Resolution of Security Council 568 of 21 June 1985. For further analysis see: T. Ruys, O. Corten, A. Hofer, “The use of force 
in international law: A case-based approach”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018, pp. 397ss. 
53Resolution of Security Council 573 of 4 October 1985. Ruys, T., Corten, O., Hofer, A., “The use of force in international 
law: A case-based approach”, op. cit., pp. 400ss. 
54N. Strapatsas, “The practice of the Security Council regarding the concept of aggression”, in C. Kress, S. Barriga, “The 
crime of aggression: A commentary”, op. cit., 
55Resolution of Security Council 326 of 26 February 1976. T. Ruys, O. Corten, A. Hofer, “The use of force in international 
law: A case-based approach”, op. cit., 
56N. Strapatsas, “The practice of the Security Council regarding the concept of aggression”, in  C. Kress, S. Barriga, “The crime 
of aggression: A commentary”, op. cit., pp. 184ss. 
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Furthermore, SC could limit itself to ascertaining in general terms the Commission of an 
act of aggression without however specifying the state conduct attributable to that particular 
violation of the use of force. For example in Resolution n.386 of 31 March 1976 the SC 
condemned in general "the acts of aggression committed by South Africa against Angola in 
violation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity"57. In these hypotheses, the Prosecutor would 
certainly be entitled to start its investigation activities without waiting for the six-month period 
foreseen in the event of failure to ascertain by SC and the subsequent authorization of the pre-
trial division. The ICC bodies will then have to identify the specific conduct, among those 
provided by art. 8 bis (2) which is attributable to that specific aggression. Vice versa, SC could 
establish that one of the specific conduct contained in art. 8 bis (2) without expressly qualifying 
those behaviors as acts of aggression. The most obvious case concerns the invasion of Kuwait 
by Iraq. In that context, in fact, while condemning the invasion, the armed attack and the illegal 
occupation of the territory of Kuwait, SC has never used the term aggression or acts of 
aggression with respect to those conducted and considering them rather as violations of use of 
force58. The situation is in this more complex hypothesis. It could be considered that the 
condition relating to the determination of SC is not satisfied. In this case, the Prosecutor may 
wait for the six-month period required to obtain an explicit assessment of SC and failing that, 
ask the pre-trial division to be able to proceed with the investigation activities. ICC could 
therefore qualify the behaviors identified by SC as true state acts of aggression in light of art. 8 
a (2). 
THE PROPOSALS PUT FORWARD REGARDING THE INVOLVEMENT OF UN 
BODIES REGARDING THE DEFINITION OF THE CONDITIONS OF 
PROSECUTION TOWARDS AGGRESSION 
The problem of SC role for the purpose of exercising ICC jurisdiction in the matter of 
aggression concerns only the hypotheses of activation of the criminal proceeding on the 
initiative of a State Party of StICC or of the Prosecutor proprio motu, given that SC action based 
on Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it is generally competent to submit to the ICC any situation 
                                                          
57N. Strapatsas, “The practice of the Security Council regarding the concept of aggression”, in  C. Kress, S. Barriga, “The 
crime of aggression: A commentary”, op. cit., 
58See the resolutions of SC n. 660 of 2 August 1990, 661 of 6 August 1991, 662 of 8 August 1990, 665 of 25 September 1990, 
674 of 29 October 1990. For further analysis see: T. Ruys, O. Corten, A. Hofer, “The use of force in international law: A case-
based approach”, op. cit., 
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in which it believes that crimes within the scope ratione materiae of the same have been 
committed59. In both situations indicated above on the basis of the proposals that emerged in 
the context of the working group on the crime of aggression set up by the Preparatory 
Commission, when an accusation of aggression comes to the fore, ICC would be required and 
recognize a right of precedence to SC evaluations in relation to the existence of a state act of 
aggression. Starting from this common premise, the advanced solutions suggest, alternatively, 
several options regarding the hypothesis in which SC, after a certain period of time, does not 
take a position60. In this context, the crucial point is therefore given by the determination of the 
value to be attributed to  SC silence61. 
The solution that this silence should in any case be interpreted as an obstacle for ICC 
jurisdiction does not seem to be acceptable62. The practice demonstrates how the inertia of SC, 
precisely in light of the predominantly political criteria, which oversee the functioning of the 
body, can be explained in widely different terms depending on the situations that arise with the 
consequence that it would be unreasonable and arbitrary to attribute to it, in the context 
currently under examination a univocal meaning, even more so when the chosen meaning leads 
to such drastic consequences as the paralysis of criminal proceedings against crimes of 
exceptional gravity63. 
As far as the subject of this work is concerned, it is interesting to note that as part of the 
attempts to identify a more suitable balance in the relations between SC and ICC in order to 
ensure a balanced division of labor in terms of assessing the aggression in its dual configuration 
respectively of state and individual crime, some States have penalized the usefulness of 
                                                          
59Art. 13, lett. b) StICC. 
60In the sense in which SC does not rule in relation to ICC's request to ascertain the existence of an act of aggression pursuant 
to art. 39 of the Charter. The options suggested in par. 5 of the consolidated proposal can thus be established: “1.The ICC could 
in any case exercise its jurisdiction; 2.The ICC would find itself in the impossibility of exercising its jurisdiction; 3.The ICC 
could ask the General Assembly to rule in the institution of the Security Council being able to exercise its jurisdiction only in 
case of ascertaining the existence of an act of aggression by this last one; 4.The ICJ could be called in a consultive manner to 
rule in the substitution of the Security Council enabling in the event of a positive reply, the ICC at the jurisdiction of the 
jurisdiction; 5.The ICJ could exercise its jurisdiction after verifying that the ICJ has previously ascertained, in the context of 
its concurrent competition, the existence of an act of aggression”. 
61R. Kherad, “La question de la dèfinition du crime d'aggression dans le statute de Rome. Entre pouvoir politique du Conseil 
de sècuritè et compètence judiciaire de la cour pènale internationale”, in Revue Gènèrale de Droit International, 109 (2), 2005, 
pp. 355ss. 
62G. Gaja, “The respective roles of the ICC and the Security Council in determining the existence of aggression”, in  M. Politi, 
G. Nesi, “The International Criminal Court: A challenge to impunity”, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot, 2001, pp. 124ss. 
63This solution is supported by the statement contained in the opinion on Namibia for which: "le fait que telle ou telle 
proposition n'ait ètè adoptèe par un organe international n'implique pas nècessarirement quìune dècision colelctive inverse ait 
ètè prise. Le rejet ou la non-approbation d'une proposition peut tenir à de nombreux motifs (...)" (par. 69) 
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attributing precisely to ICJ a role of intermediation between the two instances, given that the 
latter would be called to intervene in order to verification of the existence of acts of aggression, 
not to correct the assessment of SC but to replace the latter to remedy its possible inaction, 
when it does not pronounce, within the terms established upon ICC solicitation. 
We refer in this case to a proposal submitted to the attention of the Preparatory 
Commission from Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania64 (tripartite proposal). 
The proposal is structured as a cascade system of competences if a case of aggression is brought 
to the attention of ICC (ex artt. 14 an 15 of the Statute)65, the latter must notify SC, which in 
turn has six months to take a position on the matter66. In the event of inertia, after the indicated 
deadline has elapsed, CC may invite GA to refer the question of the existence of an act of 
aggression in the present case to ICJ67. If ICJ responds positively to the question, then the ICC 
can proceed against the alleged perpetrator of the crime68. 
In its version, the proposal from Bosnia Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania in par. 
6, lett. b) also allows ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over a case of assault even in the event that 
the attempt to obtain the assessment required by art. 39 of the Charter, this assessment is made 
by ICJ during a litigation procedure. The project in question was also accepted in the latest 
version of the coordinator's discussion paper69, not the further variant that the intervention of  
                                                          
64UN Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2/Add. 1, 27 August 2001. This is the reworking of a proposal already advanced by these 
States in February 2001 (UN Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.1, 23 February 2001) and which in its substance maintains its 
original layout, with the exception of a few exceptions. T. Dannenbaumn, “The crime of aggression, humanity and the soldier”, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2018. 
65O. Bekou, “The International Criminal Court”, op. cit., 
66Note that the six-month limit set in the proposal in question (UN Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2/Add.1, par. 5) raised in 
the first version to twelve months (UN Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.1, par. 4). 
67O. Deleau, “L'examen du rôle de la CIJ par l'Assemblèe gènèrale des Nations Unies“, in Annuaire Français de Droit 
International, 16, 1970, pp. 4ss. 
68 In the original formulation the proposal provided that once the ICJ activated the procedure before ICC (UN Doc. 
PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.1, par. 5). In the second elaboration this intermediate phase is instead eliminated foreseeing directly 
to the competence of ICC once the investigation of the aggression by ICJ has taken place (UN Doc. 
PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2/Add.1, par. 6, letter a)). In the comment to the indicated provision the proposing states raised the 
question of the attribution to ICC of a permanent authorization by GA regarding advisory questions to ICJ, a solution that 
would allow to simplify and depoliticize the whole procedure but the whose possibilities of realization are in the State canceled 
by the circumstance that art. 96, par 2 of the UN Charter expressly restricts the circle of potential beneficiaries of this 
authorization to the organs and organizations of the UN system. The attribution to ICC of a direct competence with regard to 
the request for advisory opinions to CJ is also the subject of some proposals put forward as part of the work on the draft 
agreement on relations between ICC and UN organization. For further analysis see: T. Dannenbaumn, “The crime of 
aggression, humanity and the soldier”, op. cit. 
69As you can see, the tripartite proposal is based on two main assumptions: 1.The primary, but not exclusive, nature of the role 
of SC in terms of ascertaining aggression; 2. The incompetence of ICC to express assessments pertaining to the responsibility 
of the States. D.N. Nsereko, “Aggression under the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court”, in C. Mcdougall, “The 
crime of aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2013, pp. 517ss. 
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ICJ in the consultative session could be solicited as well as by GA, on the basis of a Resolution 
with a majority of nine votes, excluding the application of the veto right of permanent 
members70. 
The solution briefly described presents unquestionable with respect to the other proposals 
put forward regarding the definition of the trigger mechanism to be applied in the matter of 
aggression. In particular, the options that tend to attribute to political bodies, especially to SC 
and GA an exclusive role in the activation of ICC jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, 
despite the formal assurances that the decisions of these bodies: "Shall not be interpreted as in 
any way affecting the independence of the Court"71, are in no way suitable for safeguarding the 
autonomy and independence of the criminal jurisdiction72. ICJ intervention would allow to 
define the conditions of prosecution in the matter of aggression on the basis of legal parameters, 
evidently more suited to the type of issue dealt with. Furthermore, taking into account the fact 
that the individual crime of aggression necessarily implies the existence of a state crime, the 
referral in case of inertia of SC to ICJ would have the merit of avoiding the direct involvement 
of ICC in an interstate dispute and at the same time would make it possible to better guarantee 
the uniqueness and coherence of the international legal system, attributing to a single judicial 
body the task of ruling on matters relating to the responsibility of states for serious injuries to 
the essential values of international society73. 
On the contrary, the objection raised against the described proposal does not convince, 
                                                          
70The solution to request for the approval of the opinion by SC a majority of nine votes originates from a proposal formulated 
by the Netherlands (UN Doc. PCNICC/2002/WGCA/DP.1 of 17 April 2002). The opportunity of introducing the described 
modification has raised some doubts: It has been argued in this regard that it would include an element of doubtful legitimacy 
in the tripartite proposal, but above all it would regret meeting the strong, if not insurmountable, opposition of the permanent 
members. C.E. Escobar Hernàndez, “Corte penal internacional, consejo de seguridad y crimen de agresiòn un equilibrio dificil 
e inestable”, in F.M. Mariňo Mènendez, “El derecho internacional en los albores del siglo XXI. Homenaje al profesor Juan 
Manuel Castro-Rial Canosa”, ed. Trotta. Fundaciòn Juan March, 2002, Madrid, pp. 262ss. C. Mcdougall, “The crime of 
aggression under the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., In reality the perplexity highlighted does not 
appear completely justified. With this precisation, the proposing delegation intended to resolve the controversial issue a priori 
to be applied to the adoption of requests for opinions. Since the setting therein coincides in fact with the general solution, not 
only do the doubts of the above mentioned doubts lose consistency from our point of view, but rather it is clear in the greater 
clarity that results from the modification indicated (in order to determine the activation modalities) of the advisory procedure) 
an element to be evaluated in positive terms. 
71The solution is taken from the text of art. 10 of StICC project presented by the Preparatory Commission to the Rome 
Conference. 
72J. Trahan, “Defining "aggression": Why the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court has faced such a 
conundrum”, in Loyola of Los Angeles International and Comparative Law Review, 24, 2002, pp. 462ss, which is affirmed 
that "the credibility of ICC regarding prosecutions for aggression would very much depend on the way the SC and/or GA make 
determinations as to state responsibility". 
73D.N. Nsereko, “Aggression under the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court”, in C. Mcdougall, “The crime of 
aggression under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 522ss. 
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which essentially hinges on the risk of politicization of the ICJ's activity which could result 
from its participation in the definition of the conditions of prosecution towards the crime of 
aggression. In this regard, apart from the completely inconsistent thesis in our opinion that the 
determination of an act of aggression far from configuring a legal question would be solely "a 
question of fact"74, it was highlighted how ICJ would be in substance called to pronounce in a 
consultative session on a bilateral dispute (between the attacked and the aggressor State) and 
that it would be unlikely that the States involved (especially the accused State) would accept 
that ICJ itself will deal with it75. The objection indicated actually confuses advisory and 
contentious jurisdiction and can be easily dismissed in light of the constant ICJ jurisprudence 
which clearly shows that ICJ has never attributed decisive importance, for the admissibility of 
a request for an opinion, to the the politicity of the question, let alone the fact that this concerned 
an interstate dispute with respect to which the parties had not both consented to its jurisdiction. 
On the other hand, the same configuration of the issues related to the Commission of acts of 
aggression in terms of purely bilateral disputes (which is at least implicitly apparent from this 
objection) lends itself, in the light of the considerations developed previously regarding the 
obligations of erga omnes and international crimes he has been to considerable criticism. 
Nor could an obstacle to the involvement of ICJ at the request of GA be identified in 
hypotheses of this kind in art. 12 of the Charter. The problem of the value to be attributed to the 
rule indicated for the purpose of determining GA's competence to activate the consultative 
procedure has already been addressed and resolved (also in the light of the clear stance taken 
on this point by ICJ in the opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in 
the occupied Palestinian territories) in negative terms so there is no need to go back to the issue 
here again76. It is sufficient to note here that the objections that the participation of GA in the 
                                                          
74J.N. Boeving, “Aggression, international law and the ICC: An argument for the withdrawal of aggression from the Rome 
Statute”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 43 (2), 2005, pp. 538ss. The author argues that the involvement of ICJ in 
the issues currently under examination would be excluded from the Rome Statute itself, which would provide for the latter only 
to resolve, to the sense of art. 119, the disputes between States Parties relative to the interpretation of the same Statute. Indeed, 
this argument seems even weaker than the one we criticized in the text, as well as being absolutely unfounded from a logical 
point of view, given that the attribution of a specific competence in a given field is not at all apt to exclude further exceptions 
attributions in different sectors. Nor does it make any sense to censor the proposal in question on the absence of the relief that 
the defendant would have no way of defending his position before ICJ. This objection, in addition to lending itself to a similar 
use also with regard to the eventual assessment opted from SC, has no real value, however it concerns an assessment that in 
the context currently under examination has only a procedural and not substantial scope. 
75D.N. Nsereko, “Aggression under the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 520ss. D.S. Mathias, 
“Remarks on the definition of aggression and the ICC”, in ASIL Proceedings, 96, 2002, pp. 182ss. 
76M. Schuster, “The Rome statute and the crimes of aggression. A gordian knot in search of a sword”, op. cit., pp. 36ss. 
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indicated proceeding could constitute a violation of the division of responsibilities for the 
maintenance of international peace and security outlined by the Charter are not in our opinion 
absolutely relevant77. 
Also the argument, undoubtedly of greater interest, according to which GA's intervention 
(but these observations are valid mutatis mutandis also with regard to SC role in the version 
presented in the consolidated proposal of the coordinator of the crime working group of 
aggression of the Preparatory Commission), resolving itself in the discretionary decision of the 
latter to activate or not the consultative procedure before ICJ would not however be suitable to 
neutralize the risks of politicization of the procedure and to adequately safeguard the 
independence of ICC78,  in our opinion not it must be dramatized, given that the influence on 
the criminal proceeding with regard to the crime of aggression of political elements probably 
constitutes an absolute factor that cannot be eliminated, but whose scope can only be mitigated, 
what the proposal currently under consideration seems to us to actually achieve79. 
On the other hand, the question of the relationship between ICC and SC in this area has 
been framed by us from the outset in terms of harmonization and balancing of potentially 
conflicting needs, i.e. peacekeeping (in a perspective mainly inspired by considerations of a 
political nature) and repression of international crimes (in a perspective on the contrary of strict 
respect for legality and law enforcement). 
The compatibility of the six-month limit within which SC should respond to the request 
of ICC with respect to the charter rules pertaining to its functioning and competences, that are 
based on the widest discretion in favor of the latter. The rule could be partially correct by 
providing for an extension in favor of SC in the event that the latter or the Secretary General 
decides to start an investigation to shed light on the facts in question. On the contrary, no delay 
in the expected times would seem to be justified in the case of simple negotiations or other 
                                                          
77M. Schuster, “The Rome statute and the crime of aggression. A gordian knot in a search of sword”, op. cit., pp. 46ss. 
78J. Trahan, “Defining "aggression": Why the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court has faced such a 
conundrum”, op. cit., pp. 462ss, the risk of politicization of the issue would be linked in practice to the fact that GA "apparently 
would retain the option of referring the issue (...)". 
79With a view to resizing the possibilities of politically motivated determinations, the modification of the present proposal is to 
be placed, which in its second formulation neutralizes the risk inherent in the first version that following the pronouncement 
of the ICJ attesting to the existence of acts of aggression, the General Assembly arbitrarily decides not to refer the matter to the 
ICC. The original formulation actually attributed to the appeal to the ICJ a purely instrumental character with respect to the 
competences of the General Assembly. In the version currently under examination, instead, once the ICJ has taken up the 
question, it has ruled on the existence of an act of aggression, the ICC can proceed immediately with the case. In this way, the 
role of filter of the General Assembly (and mutatis mutandis of the Security Council) is limited only to the activation phase of 
the ICJ advisory procedure. 
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diplomatic dispute resolution procedures, and this in consideration of the seriousness of the 
crime and its consequences. In any case, SC would always have the power attributed to it, 
pursuant to art. 16 StICC to block the exercise of jurisdiction of the latter80. 
As for the effects to be linked to the involvement of UN bodies in the determination of 
the conditions of prosecution in the matter of aggression, is discussed whether these should be 
merely procedural or even substantial. If this second perspective prevails, the determination 
made in the first instance by the indicated bodies would also condition the conduct of the 
criminal trial on the merits, as ICC cannot deviate from the assessment expressed in terms of 
state liability. In this way, the indicated assessment would constrain the decision regarding the 
existence of the individual crime by ICC itself, limiting the latter's margin of judgment to the 
assessment and determination of the degree of involvement of the accused in the participation, 
planning and organization of the aggression81. 
Although it is undeniable that a prior determination of the existence of a state act of 
aggression is likely to produce a tremendous impact on the criminal trial82, the first solution is 
certainly favored in our opinion83. It allows to guarantee the application of some fundamental 
principles that must inspire the criminal trial before ICC. We refer above all to the presumption 
of innocence, expressly provided for by art. 66 StICC, which would be disregarded in the event 
that the determination made by UN bodies also constrained the merits of ICC assessments84. 
By adopting the solution of the merely procedural nature of the intervention of UN organs 
instead, the procedural guarantees in favor of the accused would be reserved and ICC would be 
recognized the possibility of pronouncing in total independence regarding the existence of the 
crime and the degree of the accused's responsibility85. The consideration that the standard of 
                                                          
80O. Bekou, “The International Criminal Court”, op. cit., 
81I.K. Müller-Schieke, “Defining the crime of aggression under the statute of the International Criminal Court”, in Leiden 
Journal of International Law, 14 (2), 2001, pp. 428ss. 
82S.A. Fernàndez De Gourmendi, “The working group on aggression at the preparatory commission for the International 
Criminal Court”, in Fordham International Law Journal, 25, 2001-2002, pp. 606ss. 
83D. Sarooshi, “Aspects of the relationship between the International Criminal Court and the United Nations”, in Netherlands 
Yearbook of International Law, 32, 2001, pp. 28ss. 
84In this orientation see: W.A. Schabas, “Follow up to Rome: preparing for entry into force of the International Criminal Court 
Statute”, in Human Rights Law Journal, 20, 1999, pp. 158ss, "(...) an accused could arrive before the court with the central 
factual issue in the charge already determined and not subject to change (...)". 
85V. Gowlland-Debbas, “The relationship between political and judicial organs if international organizations: The role of the 
Security Council in the new International Criminal Court”, in L. Boisson De Chazournes, C.P.R. Romano, R. Mackenzie, 
“International organizations and international dispute settlement. Trends and prospects”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2002, 
pp. 108ss. 
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proof in the criminal trial is notoriously higher than that required for state liability86 also 
supports the thesis accepted here. Nor is the objection that, in the event that SC has previously 
ascertained the existence of an act of aggression, the determination made on the basis of art. 39 
would be binding on Member States under the terms of art. 25 of the Charter, for which the 
latter would be required to accord the evaluation of SC prevalent character with respect to ICC 
judgment and this by virtue of the provisions of art. 103 of the Charter87. In our opinion, it does 
not make sense to extend the scope of application of art. 103 also to the activity of mere 
verification carried out by  SC pursuant to art. 3988. This activity is essentially procedural in 
Chapter VII of the Charter, constituting a necessary precondition for the adoption of coercive 
measures aimed at peacekeeping89,  therefore it does not impose any legal obligation in the 
proper sense on Member States, likely to enjoy the prevalence granted by the aforementioned 
provision90. 
For the sake of completeness, it should be noted that the indicated solution, favorable to 
the independence of the ICC's assessments with respect to those made in terms of state liability, 
lends itself to raising very difficult consequences to be regulated in the event that these are 
made by ICJ, according to the model proposed by the tripartite proposal. If accepted as a 
solution of general application, the idea of the merely procedural nature of the prior 
determination of an act of state aggression is clear that the risk of conflicts between the 
assessments of ICJ and those of ICC presents  extremely serious profiles91. In this regard, a 
situation of connection would appear to arise between proceedings in progress before 
international courts, with respect to which international practice is not currently able to provide 
adequate answers, given the absolute novelty of a situation of this kind. In this regard, the above 
question is immediately closely linked to the highly discussed issue, at a purely theoretical 
level, in the configurability of a hierarchy of dispute resolution procedures at international level. 
It must be said that in a more general perspective, the risk of contradictory solutions regardless 
of the choices made regarding the involvement of other bodies in defining the conditions of 
                                                          
86A. Nollakaemper, “Concurrence between individual responsibility and state responsibility in international law”, in 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 52 (3), 2003, pp. 616ss. 
87M. Schuster, “The Rome statute and the crime of aggression. A gordian knot in a search of sword”, op. cit., pp. 40ss. 
88O. Bekou, “The International Criminal Court”, op. cit., 
89S. Yee, “A proposal to reformulate article 23 of the ILC draft statute for an International Criminal Court”, in Hastings 
International and Comparative Law Review, 19, 1995-1996, pp. 534ss. 
90D.N. Nsereko, “Aggression under the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 508ss. 
91C.E. Escobar Hernàndez, “Corte penal internacional, consejo de seguridad y crimen de agresiòn un equilibrio dificil e 
inestable”, in F.M. Mariňo Mènendez, “El derecho internacional en los albores del siglo XXI. Homenaje al profesor Juan 
Manuel Castro-Rial Canosa”, op. cit., pp. 262ss. 
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prosecution towards the crime of aggression, already exists at present due to the existence to 
which we have previously referred a plurality of international bodies authorized, albeit with 
regard to different purposes and in specific institutional contexts, to ascertain the existence of 
acts of aggression. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Several proposals have been made with a view to involving the UN bodies in SC first in 
determining the existence of the crime of aggression, in order to avoid a dangerous overlap in 
such a sensitive and politically sensitive matter of  UN activity to protect peace and that of ICC 
in the field of repression of the most serious crimes under international law92. 
The initial idea is that since the crime of aggression necessarily presupposes the existence 
of an act of aggression, that is to say a particularly serious offense attributable to a State93, a SC 
definition regarding the ascertainment of the existence of such this case would in principle 
always be desirable for ICC to exercise its jurisdiction over the alleged offender. 
Pursuant to art. 5, par. 2 StICC the definition of the conditions under which ICC can 
exercise its jurisdiction over the crime in question must be in harmony with the relevant 
                                                          
92It is clear that the question of the relationship between ICC and SC in this area is intimately linked to the problem related to 
the definition of the crime of aggression itself. Suffice it to note the aspects that are likely to strongly encapsulate the solution 
to be attributed to the question of the involvement of UN organs in determining the conditions of transferability in relation to 
the crime under consideration. On the one hand the idea that the rape of aggression necessarily concerns individuals that are at 
the political and military levels of a state (M. Politi, G. Nesi, “The international court and the crime of aggression”, ed. 
Routledge, Burlington, 2004) and, on the other, that for which aggression could only be prosecuted if actually carried out 
thereby excluding the criminalization of mere preparatory acts. With regard to the definition of the case to be included in this 
notion, various principal orientations have emerged up to now, depending on whether a formulation is privileged in general and 
abstract terms of the case, centered on the prohibition of the armed force supported by art. 2, par. 4 of the UN Charter; or an 
example of cases similar to the same model based on Resolution n. 3314 (XXIX) of 1973 of GA; or finally a narrow definition 
of crime, limited only to the war of aggression. For further details see: R.S. Clark, “Rethinking aggression as a crime and 
formulating its elements. The final work-product of the preparatory commission for the International Criminal Court”, in 
Leiden Journal of International Law, 15 (4), 2002, pp. 860ss. 
93I.K. Müller-Schieke, “Defining the crime of aggression under the statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 
410ss, "(…) the crime of aggression is inherently a state crime. Although the idea of initiating an armed conflict originates and 
develops in the minds of individuals the aggressive act emanates as an act of the State, not of its intellectual initiators (...)". See 
also in argument: C.E. Escobar Hernàndez, “Corte penal internacional, consejo de seguridad y crinen de agresiòn un equilibrio 
dificil e inestable”, in F.M. Mariňo Mènendez, “El derecho internacional en los alores del siglo XXI. Homenaje al profesor 
Juan Manuel Castro-Rial Canosa”, op. cit., pp. 244ss, which correctly highlights how the determination of the existence of a 
state act of aggression would necessarily be configured as "condiciln de procedibilidad bàsica de toda actuaciòn de la CPI (...)". 
This consequence would be derived neither from the UN Charter nor from StICC, but from the "proper conception and internal 
development" of the crime. The same jurisprudence of individuals for acts of aggression always presupposes a state 
responsibility state to which the acts in question should be imputed. In this direction see art. 2, par. 2 of the project of the code 
of crimes against peace and security of humanity, in Annuarie de la Commission de Droit Internationale, 1996, II, 2, p.15ss and 
par. 4 of the comment of art. 16 of the same project. The described approach that is established in the works on the definition 
of ICC jurisdiction in relation to the crime of aggression excludes the possibility of criminalizing in these same terms certain 
devastating forms of terrorism, planned and implemented by non-state entities and not connected to a State on the basis of the 
traditional criteria of imputation due to international law (but which in terms of size and effects, can be equated with real 
aggressions). 
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provisions of the UN Charter. The dominant opinion is that this clarification was intended 
precisely to safeguard the prerogatives of SC of ex chapter VII of UN Charter and highlight the 
absolutely pre-eminent role94. On the other hand, this statement constitutes an essential starting 
point if it wants to develop a proposal that is politically acceptable and in consideration of the 
very stringent conditions required for its adoption, it can count on a substantial support from 
the States. 
Given that therefore a certain role to SC in this matter must be ensured and guaranteed, 
given the logical link in terms of aggression between state responsibility and criminal liability 
of the individual, the next step is to determine specifically what this role consists of and what 
consequences it leads to ICC operation. It is clear that the involvement of SC in the functioning 
of the court mechanism poses a serious threat to the independence and autonomy of the Court. 
Essential requirements for the correct and effective performance of judicial functions. The same 
principle of equality of individuals before the law would risk undergoing unacceptable 
compressions, given that SC members of exercising their right of veto could remove from ICC 
jurisdiction cases involving their own citizens or in which their interests result in various title 
involved95. 
The definition of the conditions of prosecution towards the crime of aggression requires 
a delicate work of harmonization between the competences and the operating methods of ICC 
and SC96. In other words, a difficult balance must be found between the objectives of promoting 
international criminal justice and protecting the peace. While in a first phase (which we can 
temporarily place in the context of the negotiation that preceded the Rome Conference), the 
need for involvement in this area of SC was mostly motivated on the basis of the assertion of 
                                                          
94M.H. Arsanjani, “The Rome statute of the International Criminal Court”, in American Journal of International Law, 93, 
1999, pp. 22ss.  H.A.M. Von Hebel, D. Robinson, “Crimes within the jurisdiction of the court”, in S.K. Lee, “The International 
Criminal Court. The making of the Rome statute. Issues, negotiations, results”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 
Boston, London, 1999, pp. 80ss.   L. Yee, “Not just a war crimes court: the penal regime established by the Rome statute of 
the International Criminal Court”, in Singapore Academy of Law Journal, 10, 1998, pp. 322ss., the engraving contained in art. 
5, par. 2 of StICC intends to guarantee against any pronouncements of ICC in contrast with previous assessments of SC pursuant 
to art. 39 of the UN Charter. 
95C. Carpenter, “The International Criminal Court and the crime of aggression”, op. cit., pp. 224ss. I.K. Müller-Schieke, 
“Defining the crime of aggression under the statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 426ss. R. Pierce, “Which 
of the preparatory commission's latest proposals for the definition of the crime of aggression and the exercise of jurisdiction 
should be adopted into the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court?”, in Brigham Young University Journal of Public 
Law, 15, 2000-2001, pp. 282ss. G. Gaja, “The long journey towards repressing aggression”, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. 
Jones, “The Rome statute of the International Criminal Court. A commentary”, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002, pp. 
434ss. 
96I.K. Müller-Schieke, “Defining the crime of aggression under the statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 
424ss. 
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the absolute exclusivity of competences of this body regarding the assessment of the case in 
question (for which a prior assessment pursuant to art. 39 of the Charter was indicated as an 
indispensable condition for the exercise of  ICC jurisdiction)97, from the proposals subsequently 
discussed in the context of the tendency to reduce the centrality of the SC role emerged from 
the Preparatory Commission and the working group on the crime of aggression, thus favoring 
the independence of the functions assigned to ICC itself in this matter98. 
This approach appears undoubtedly preferable. It is based on the widely acceptable 
                                                          
97The draft of the Statute of 1994 (in Rapport de la Commission du droit international, quarante-sixième section (2 mai-22 
juillet 1994), in Annuaire de la Commission de Droit Internationale proposing a scheme followed already by the provisional 
version of the project of crimes against the peace and security of humanity adopted in 1991 guaranteed the SC exclusive 
competence by establishing in article 23, paragraph 2 that "une plainte ne peut être dèposèe en vertu du prèsent statut pour un 
acte d'agression ou en liaison directe avec un tel acte que si le conseil de sècuritè a constatè au prèable qu'un État a commis 
l'acte d'agression faisant l'objet de la plainte". Paragraph 3 of the same provision further strengthens the board's position with 
respect to ICC by providing that: "aucune poursuite ne peut être engagèe en  vertu du prèsent statut à raison d'une situation 
dont le Conseil de sècuritè taite en tant que menace contre la paix ou rupure de la paix ou acte d'agression aux termes du 
chapitre VII de la Charte des Nations Unies, à moins que le Conseil de sècuritè n'en dècide autrement". In line with this first 
formulation strongly defended above all by the SC permanent members the project of the Statute elaborated in the Preparatory 
Commission of 1998 confirmed in principle slightly attenuating the scope, this same approach. Article 10 provided that no 
provision could be initiated in the event that SC was exercising its functions under the terms of Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
unless expressly authorized by it, with the consequence that the exercise of ICC jurisdiction to the crime of aggression was 
allowed only in the hypothesis in which it had determined that the relative state action integrated the extremes of an act of 
aggression (Report of the Preparatory Committee on the establishment of an International Criminal Court, UN Doc. 
A/CONF.183/2/Add. 1, 14 April 1998). Already in the phase preceding the Rome Conference the question began to be more 
controversial. The related debate soon resulted in an open and clear opposition between SC permanent members and other 
States. Also in the light of these contrasts, the proposals relating to the aspects indicated began to present far more articulated 
schemes while continuing to essentially preserve a leading role for SC. In this sense, see also the proposal of Cameroon during 
the Rome Conference in which, although recognizing the priority of SC role in assessing the crime of aggression, the possibility 
for ICC to initiate an investigation was admitted on a subsidiary basis. If SC within a reasonable period of time had not 
responded to the request, addressed by the Court to express its opinion regarding the existence of the case in question (UN Doc. 
A/CONF/.183/C.1/L.39, 2 July 1998, Option B, par. 4) and similarly that presented by Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Arab Emirates, 
Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Syria, Sudan, Tunisia and Yemen (A Doc. A/CONF.183/C.1/L.56, 8 July 1998). The 
prospect favorable to the importance of SC political role continued to find expressions of support even after the approval of the 
Statute of Rome emblematic results were put forward in the Preparatory Commission by the Russian Federation (UN Doc. 
PCNICC/1999/DP.12, 29 July 1999) and of Germany (UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/DP.13, 30 July 1999). For further details see 
also: R. Wedgwood, “The International Criminal Court: An American view”, in European Journal of International Law, 10, 
1999, pp. 94ss. D.S. Mathias, J.N. Boeving, “Aggression, international law and the ICC: An argument for the withdrawal of 
aggression form the Rome Statute”, in Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 43, 2005, pp. 576ss. N. Koursami, “The 
contextual elements of the crime of genocide”, ed. Springer, Berlin, 2018, pp. 126ss. 
98In this direction the text proposed by Greece and Portugal according to which ICC jurisdiction in matters of aggression should 
be subordinated to a prior determination made by SC pursuant to art. 39 of the Charter but this determination could be solicited 
directly by ICC itself with the result that, if SC does not pronounce itself within 12 months from the request (in favor or against 
as to the existence of an aggression or by issuing a Resolution, ex art.16 of the ICC Statute), ICC could proceed with the 
examination of the case (UN Doc. PCNICC/1999/2000WGGA/DP.2, 7 December 1999). For similar solutions see the proposal 
of Colombia (UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGCA / DP.1) and (UN Doc. PCNICC/2000/WGGA/DP.2, 17 March 2000 and the one 
developed by Bosnia and Herzegovina, New Zealand and Romania (UN Doc. PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.2/Add. 1, 27 August 
2001). This is the reworking of a proposal already put forward by these same States in February of 2001 (UN Doc. 
PCNICC/2001/WGCA/DP.1, 23 February 2001) and that in substance it maintains the original plant except for a few 
exceptions. For a comment see: R. KHERAD, La question de la dèfinition du crime d'agression dans le statue de Rome. Entre 
pouvoir politique du Conseil de sècuritè et compètence judiciare de la cour pènale internationale, op. cit., pp. 358ss. The trend 
highlighted in the text is also confirmed also in the work of the special working group on the crime of aggression established 
by the Assembly of States Parties. The proposal made by Cuba foresees in par. 2 that: "The lack of a determination shall not 
impede the exercise of the court's jurisdiction with respect to a case referred to it", ICC.ASP/2/SWGCA/DP.1, 4 September 
2003. 
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assumption of the denial of the exclusivity of SC assessment powers in the matter of 
aggression99. The validity of this solution, on the other hand, is largely supported, in relation to 
the division of competences within the UN system from the examination carried out so far, 
especially in light of the role that in this regard is attributed to ICJ itself and to the autonomy 
of the functions of the latter compared to those of the other bodies of the Organization. In fact, 
the main judicial UN body can without a doubt also have a say in the matter of aggression, both 
in the context of the consultative function (being able to pronounce on any legal issue) and in 
the context of the contentious function (by virtue of the broad definition of the notion of legal 
disputes resulting from art.36 of the Statute). Far from remaining purely theoretical, this 
competence has actually been recognized and exercised by ICJ in practice: The Nicaragua 
case100, the appeals of Yugoslavia against some NATO countries regarding the lawfulness of 
the use of force or even the cases brought by the Democratic Republic of Congo against 
neighboring states accused of committing acts of armed aggression on the applicant's territory. 
If ICJ is a UN organ, it retains its own autonomous competence in the matter, but is not 
clear how the powers attributed by SC of Chapter VII of the UN Charter can determine an 
overall barrier for the jurisdiction of an organ competence on the repression of individual 
crimes101, and established on the basis of a treaty formally completely independent from the 
UN Charter102. On the other hand, the same relations between SC and ad hoc tribunals set up 
                                                          
99In the sense that SC is not accorded pursuant to the same UN Charter, the monopoly of ascertaining acts of aggression. S.M. 
Yengejeh, “Reflection on the role of the Security Council in determining an act of aggression”, in M. Politi, G. Nesi, “The 
International Criminal Court and the crime of aggression”, Ashgate Publishing, 2001, pp. 128ss. 
100M. Schuster, “The Rome statute and the crime of aggression. A gordian knot in a search of sword”, op. cit., pp. 48ss, who 
draws from it the incompetence of ICJ to decide issues that fall within the discretionary competences of SC, ex Chapter VII. 
On the other hand, the competences of SC regarding the verification of acts of aggression pursuant to art. 39 of the UN Charter 
is justified exclusively in view of the potential assumption of concrete measures aimed at restoring peace and internal security. 
On the contrary, SC does not at all have the power to decide on the basis of the aforementioned assessment, the conditions for 
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction against individuals. Emblematic in the perspective described are the observations of 
dissident judge Scwebel on the sidelines of the sentence of 1986 on military and paramilitary activities in Nicaragua, ICJ 
Reports, 1986, p. 290, par. 60, "(...) while SC is invested by the Charter with the authority to determine the existence of an act 
of aggression, it does not act as a Court in making such a determination. It may arrive at a determination of aggression-or, as 
more often is the case, fail to arrive at a determination of aggression (...) for political rather than legal reasons (...)". 
101G. Gaja, “The long journey towards repressing aggression”, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones, “The Rome statute of 
the International Criminal Court. A commentary”, op. cit., pp. 124ss. G. Gaja, “The respective roles of the ICC and the Security 
Council in determining the existence of aggression”, in M. Politi, F. Nesi, “The International Criminal Court and the crime of 
aggression”, op. cit., pp. 124ss. L.J. Springrose, “Aggression as a core crime in the Rome statute establishing an International 
Criminal Court”, in Saint Louis-Warsaw Transnational Law Journal, 99, 1999, pp. 152ss. I.K. Müller-Schieke, “Defining the 
crime of aggression under the statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 426ss. 
102The considerations developed in the text confirm the possibility at least in principle of involving ICJ in the process of defining 
the conditions of admissibility with regard to the crime of aggression on a concurrent basis, at the most subsidiary to the role 
attributed to SC in this scope. At the same time they highlight the risk of inconsistencies and contrasts between ICJ's 
jurisprudence on the subject and the future ICC positions. C.E. Escobar Hernàndez, “Corte penal internacional, consejo de 
seguridad y crinen de agresiòn un equilibrio dificil e inestable”, in F.M. Mariňo Mènendez, “El derecho internacional en los 
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by it are not expressive of an absolute primautè of the former with respect to the latter, as in the 
jurisprudence relating to the Tadić and Kanyabashi cases amply testifies. 
The non-exclusive nature of SC competences in the matter of ascertaining the case in 
question is further confirmed by the powers exercised in this area by GA. Finally, it was found 
that pursuant to art. 51 of the Charter any State (not only the one that suffers the aggression, but 
also all the other States, acting in collective legitimate defense) would in fact be empowered to 
operate this qualification103. 
A further consideration is necessary: The SC has traditionally shown that it is not very 
inclined to express itself in favor of the existence of an act of aggression, preferring to refer 
rather to the politically more neutral notion of threat to peace104. This choice must be ascribed 
to the type of variables that SC takes into consideration when carrying out this type of 
evaluation and to the crucial role that realpolitik factors play between them. Qualifying the 
conduct of a State in terms of aggression is the most serious condemnation that a State can be 
imposed. It follows that a determination of this content may in many cases even be incompatible 
with the pacification effort carried out by SC through the conduct of negotiations and good 
offices, as well as further stiffen the position of the aggressor State105. 
The absolutely central (if not preponderant) relevance of the methods of political 
management of the aggression would find its rationale in the reversibility of the crime in 
question, reversibility which constitutes a completely peculiar and specific characteristic of the 
case in question compared to the other crimes falling within the ICC competence106. Add to this 
the SC Member States themselves may have an interest in not compromising their relations 
with the responsible state for which they could prevent avoiding the reference to the notion of 
aggression. 
It is therefore evident that subordinating the exercise of ICC jurisdiction in the matter of 
aggression to a prior assessment by SC would generally end up making the application of the 
                                                          
alores del siglo XXI. Homenaje al profesor Juan Manuel Castro-Rial Canosa”, op. cit., pp. 250ss. 
103For these conclusions see also the document on the historical analysis of the facts concerning the aggression, drawn up from 
the UN General Secretary (PCNICC/2002/WGCA/L.1, 24 January 2001). 
104G. Gaja, “The long journey towards repressing aggression”, in A. Cassese, P. Gaeta, J.R.W.D. Jones, “The Rome statute of 
the International Criminal Court. A commentary”, op. cit., pp. 124ss. P. Escarameia, “The ICC and the Security Council on 
aggression: Overlapping competences?”, in  M. Politi, F. Nesi, “The International Criminal Court and the crime of aggression”, 
op. cit., pp. 133, 140ss. 
105C. Antonopoulos, “Whatever happened to crimes against peace?”, in Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 6 (1), 2001, pp. 
33ss. 
106C. Antonopoulos, “Whatever happened to crimes against peace?”, op. cit., pp. 38ss. 
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provisions of the Statute relating to this crime completely uncertain107, making it ultimately 
dependent analysis from purely political considerations108. 
The idea of involvement of the main UN judicial bodies in this field appears in principle 
to be assessed in positive terms, and meets with some favor in doctrine109. Its main limitation 
is linked to the duration of the consultative procedure before ICJ, whose participation in the 
determination of the conditions of prosecution towards the crime of aggression could effectively 
lead to an excessive dilation of the criminal trial110.  On the other hand, we do not want to deny 
that the proposal indicated also has further weaknesses and therefore needs to be properly 
corrected and enhanced. 
An overall judgment cannot be separated from some more general reflections: The 
question of the definition of aggression has always been one of the thorniest and most 
controversial issues of international law111. 
The problems raised by this situation have therefore led some to believe that it was even 
preferable to eliminate any reference to the crime of aggression from StICC112. In support of 
this perspective, it was stressed that ICC is already competent under the Statute to prosecute 
                                                          
107C. Antonopoulos, “Whatever happened to crimes against peace?”, op. cit., pp. 48ss. G. Gaja, “The respective roles of the 
ICC and the Security Council in determining the existence of aggression”, in M. Politi, F. Nesi, “The International Criminal 
Court and the crime of aggression”, op. cit., pp. 124ss. D.N. Nsereko, “Aggression under the Rome statute of the International 
Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 515ss. On the contrary, it seems rather naive to expect that the attribution of the power to activate 
ICC jurisdiction against the material perpetrators of aggression can determine in itself a greater propensity of SC to refer to the 
notion indicated in the context of the assessment, ex art. 39 of the Charter. I.K. Müller-Schieke, “Defining the crime of 
aggression under the statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 424, which is affirmed that "(...) it would be 
illusory to believe that the court might serve as a catalyst for a clear pronunciation by the Council on the concept of aggression". 
M. Schuster, “The Rome statute and the crime of aggression. A gordian knot in a search of sword”, op. cit., pp. 42ss. 
108C. Antonopoulos, “Whatever happened to crimes against peace?”, op. cit., pp. 49ss. I.K. Müller-Schieke, “Defining the 
crime of aggression under the statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 426ss. D.N. Nsereko, “Aggression 
under the Rome statute of the International Criminal Court”, op. cit., pp. 514ss. 
109S.M. Yengejeh, “Reflection on the role of the Security Council in determining an act of aggression”, in M. Politi, G. Nesi, 
“The International Criminal Court and the crime of aggression”, op. cit. pp. 130ss, which believes that the option described 
has at least two advantages: "(...) First it is based on the Charter provisions. Second, ICJ is the judicial organ of the organization 
and has the competence to provide an impartial and independent advisor opinion (...) seems to be the best equipped for that, as 
the principal judicial organ of UN" and more laconically J.F.E. Escudero Espinosa, “Los poderes del Consejo de Seguridad y 
la corte penal internacional en el estatuto de Roma”, in Annuario de Derecho Internacional, 19, 2003, pp. 257ss, it should be 
noted that a part of the doctrine can deny the opportunity of introducing the system described with regard to ICC jurisdiction 
in terms of aggression, it also believes that the tripartite proposal contains interesting ideas that should be valued rather in the 
management of the possible issues of legitimacy of SC action pursuant to articles 13, lett. b) and 16 StICC, which could be 
highlighted in the course of a criminal investigation. I. Petculescu, “The review of the United Nation Security Council decisions 
by the International Court of Justice”, in Netherlands International Law Review, 52 (2), pp. 194ss. 
110M. Schuster, “The Rome statute and the crime of aggression. A gordian knot in a search of sword”, op. cit., pp. 50ss. 
111W.A. Schabas, “The unfinished work of defining aggression: How many times must the cannonballs fly, before they are 
forever banned?”,  in D. Mcgoldrick, P. Rowe, E. Donnelly (ed. by), “The Permanent International Criminal Court. Legal and 
policy issues”, Hart Publishing, Oxford & Portland, Oregon, 2004. 
112J.N., Boeving, “Aggression, international law and the ICC: An argument for the withdrawal of aggression from the Rome 
Statute”, op. cit., pp. 542ss.   
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other crimes that are committed in the course of armed conflicts due to their characteristics, so 
even if the jurisdiction of the same towards aggression is not foreseen directly those responsible 
for this crime could always be prosecuted on the basis of other charges. 
This is actually a very dangerous idea in itself: As it has been pointed out, giving up the 
ICC's jurisdiction over aggression would create the very serious feeling that "individual 
perpetrators of aggression may act with impunity"113 and would mean repudiating the 
inheritance of Nurmberg with serious damage to the credibility and prestige of ICC itself. On 
the other hand, the inclusion of aggression in ICC ratione materiae powers retains a fundamental 
and not negligible symbolic value and in reflecting the will of the majority of States to pursue 
this crime, produces a deterrent effect that should not be underestimated114. Furthermore, the 
fact that the most serious abuses are committed in the course of arm conflicts does not justify 
but rather sets against any attempt to remove the aggression from the criminal cases to which 
the ICC's jurisdiction extends. This elimination "should be tantamount in many cases to treating 
mere symptoms while ignoring the pathogenic cause"115. 
As far as this investigation is concerned more directly, the perspectives examined in the 
previous paragraphs regarding a more articulated division and work between the organs of UN 
and ICC in the persecution of the crime of aggression are once again expressive of an attempt 
aimed at identifying a as balanced as possible solution to the eternal conflict between the 
reasons of legality and justice on the one hand and the logic of politics and power on the other 
and it is above all with a view to the aim assumed that this effort must be evaluated and in our 
opinion encouraged. 
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